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Social NormS iN the courtS of  
aNcieNt atheNS
Adriaan Lanni
1
AbstrAct
Ancient Athens was a remarkably peaceful and well-ordered society by both an-
cient and contemporary standards. Scholars typically attribute Athens’ success to 
internalized norms and purely informal enforcement mechanisms. This article ar-
gues that the formal Athenian court system played a vital role in maintaining order 
by enforcing informal norms. This peculiar approach to norm enforcement com-
pensated for apparent weaknesses in the state system of coercion. It mitigated 
the effects of under-enforcement in a private prosecution system by encouraging 
litigants to uncover and punish their opponents’ past violations. Court enforce-
ment of extra-statutory norms also permitted the Athenians to enforce a variety 
of social norms while maintaining the fictions of voluntary devotion to military and 
public service and of limited state interference in private conduct. 
Informal norms have lately been celebrated as an important adjunct to for-
mal law in regulating behavior (e.g., Ellickson 1991). There is a rich academ-
ic literature examining the relationship between social norms and informal 
sanctions (such as gossip or private dispute resolution) on the one hand, and 
formal legal rules and institutions on the other (e.g., Law and Society Review 
2000; Journal of Legal Studies 1998; University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
1996). Scholars have explored these issues in various social settings: the in-
ternational diamond trade (Bernstein 1992), the cotton industry (Bernstein 
2001), the Tokyo tuna market (Feldman 2006), the champagne fairs of the 
1  Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to William Alford, David Barron, 
Mary Sarah Bilder, Victor Bers, Gabriella Blum, Rachel Brewster, Robert Clark, Glenn Cohen, 
Daniel Coquillette, Christine Desan, Charles Donahue, Robert Ellickson, Bruce Frier, Gerald 
Frug, Michael Gagarin, Jack Goldsmith, Robert Gordon, Thomas Green, James Grenier, Morton 
Horwitz, Wesley Kelman, Duncan Kennedy, Daryl Levinson, Bruce Mann, Martha Minow, Wil-
liam Nelson, Gerald Neuman, Josiah Ober, Mark Ramsayer, Benjamin Roin, Benjamin Sachs, Jed 
Shugerman, Matthew Stephenson, William Stuntz, Robert Tsai, Adrian Vermeule, Elizabeth War-
ren, Lloyd Weinreb, James Whitman, John Witt, Noah Zatz, the reviewers for the Journal of Legal 
Analysis, and the participants at the Boston College Legal History Roundtable, the Yale/Stanford 
Junior Scholars Workshop, and the Harvard Law School Faculty Workshop for helpful conversa-
tions about this project. 
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early Middle Ages (Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990), cattle ranching 
in California (Ellickson 1991), and the world of Japanese sumo wrestling 
(West 1997). Each of these studies attempts to delineate one approach to the 
enforcement of norms, and to explore how and how well this arrangement 
operated within its social context. This Article aims to add ancient Athens to 
the list. The Athenian case is particularly interesting for two reasons. While 
much of the norms literature focuses on the choice between informal and 
formal norms and institutions,
2 in Athens informal norms were enforced 
through the formal court system. As we will see, the formal enforcement of 
putatively informal norms had a number of interesting consequences, such 
as veiling some of the highly coercive aspects of Athenian society. Second, 
the Athenian rejection of the rule of law in its court proceedings paradoxi-
cally promoted public order and compliance with both norms and laws.
In classical Athens, there was no professional police force to investigate 
crime or to arrest and detain offenders (Hunter 1994). And there was no 
state prosecutor charged with bringing charges in the interests of the pub-
lic (Todd 1993). Every step in the legal process, from the summons to the 
enforcement of judgments, depended on private initiative.
3 As a result, the 
prosecution of crime and other violations of law was irregular, turning not 
on the seriousness or visibility of the infraction, but on the ability of the 
victim to bring charges or the willingness of personal or political enemies of 
the defendant to step in and serve as volunteer prosecutors (see Christ 1998 
for a discussion of the motivation of volunteer prosecutors). Once in court, 
the law under which a case was brought played a surprisingly small role 
in litigants’ arguments and jurors’ decisions. Litigants regularly boasted of 
their services to the state and their honorable treatment of their neighbors, 
2  See, e.g., Bernstein 1992 (describing why the diamond trade opted for private dispute resolu-
tion procedures); West 1997 (describing the relative advantages of rules and norms in the 
context of the governance of sumo wrestling in Japan); Ellickson 1991 (arguing that the rela-
tionship of the parties, the size of the stakes, the complexity of the dispute and the ability to 
externalize costs determine whether informal or formal norms are favored). Robert Cooter 
(1996) has suggested that in some circumstances courts should look to norms that have arisen 
in specialized business communities in determining fault and liability. And, of course, custom 
has long been a part of the common law. But Cooter’s suggestion and the use of custom are 
different from the Athenian approach in one crucial respect: rather than using informal norms 
to give content to the rules and standards provided for by law, Athenian courts enforced extra-
statutory norms that were completely unrelated to the legal issue in dispute. 
3  Hunter 1994. As Harris (2007) points out, there are inscriptions indicating that magistrates did 
have some enforcement powers, though these are largely limited to protecting sacred areas and 
what appear to be largely honorific pronouncements to protect specific honorands.
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friends, and family, and attacked their opponents for everything from draft-
dodging to sexual deviance (see, e.g., Lanni 2006; Carey 1994). Many clas-
sical scholars contend that informal norms often trumped law in a process 
that bears little relation to the modern notion of the rule of law.
4
And  yet, Athens  was  a  remarkably  peaceful  and  well-ordered  society 
(Herman 2006, 206–215).
5 Violent crime appears to have been much less 
prevalent than in other ancient societies, notably Rome (Herman 2006, 206–
215; Cohen 1995, 7). When citizens walked from the countryside to the city 
or to the port to attend the Assembly, to do business at the market, or to visit 
friends, they did not arm themselves or take other precautions against theft 
or attack (Herman 2006, 206–215). Classicists debate whether Athens had 
enough coercive force to qualify as a “state” in the modern sense (Hunter 
1994, 185–186), and yet Athenians did obey the law with remarkable regu-
larity: the wealthy and powerful paid taxes and fulfilled their legal obliga-
tion to support public festivals;
6 ordinary Athenians showed up for military 
service despite a near-constant state of war (Finley 1985, 67); and hundreds 
of citizens chosen by lot served as unpaid government officials each year 
(Hansen 1979). To be sure, the volume of litigation suggests that conflict 
was common. But so was cooperation and trust. We hear of neighbors and 
4  E.g., Christ 1998: 193–196 (arguing that Athenian jurors ignored the letter of the law in favor 
of justice, often relying on the character of the litigants and the city’s best interests in making 
their decisions); Lanni 2006, 175 (arguing that the Athenian popular courts were consciously 
designed to favor discretionary and equitable judgments rather than the application of gener-
alized rules); Allen 2000, 179–182 (arguing that the Athenian courts followed a “rule of [juror] 
judgment” rather than a “rule of law”); Cohen 1995, 183 (arguing that Athenian jurors “appear 
to reach judgment on the basis of values and expectations fundamentally alien to the contem-
porary ideology of judicial process and the rule of law.”). Other scholars disagree with this 
model of the courts and argue that the Athenians did attempt to implement a rule of law (e.g., 
Rhodes 2004, 137; Harris 2000, 1994, 78 and n.85; Thür 2007).
5  Not all scholars agree with Herman’s characterization of Athens as a peaceful society. Most 
notably, Cohen 1995, 61–86, 119 characterizes Athens as an agonistic feuding society, and 
contends that violence was much more common (and more commonly tolerated) than Her-
man’s account would suggest. Yet even Cohen agrees that classical Athens “displayed remark-
able political stability” (1995, 6), and experienced much less civic violence than, for example, 
republican Rome: “Athenians appear to have pursued their vendettas largely in politics and the 
courts without resorting to lethal violence. In late Republican Rome or in Italian City States in 
the Renaissance, on the other hand, vendetta, factional violence, and murder seemed to have 
played a far more important role in civic life than in Athens, despite its less ‘developed’ legal 
system.” (1995, 7).
6  Sinclair 1988, 54–64 describes the financial obligations of wealthy citizens. To be sure, at-
tempts to avoid liturgies, taxes, and military service were not unknown in Athens (on which, 
see Christ 2006) but despite little formal enforcement such shirking does not appear to have 
seriously impeded the operation of state functions.
3694  ~  Lanni: Social Norms in the Courts of Ancient Athens
friends helping each other in times of need with security-free, interest-free 
loans and other services (Millett 1991, 153–154). And the Athenians created 
an environment conducive to secure and reliable business transactions, one 
that fostered an active economy that attracted merchants and traders from 
all over the ancient world (Herman 2006, 386; Ober 2008a, 39–79).
The Athenian court system plays little role in conventional explanations 
for Athens’ success as a well-ordered society. Instead, scholars tend to em-
phasize the importance of informal social control and internalized norms 
in maintaining order. In Policing Athens, Virginia Hunter focuses on infor-
mal social sanctions such as gossip and private dispute resolution mecha-
nisms such as family courts and private arbitration (Hunter 1994).
7 Gabriel 
Herman’s Morality and Behaviour in Democratic Athens posits that small 
size and an internalized code of behavior requiring self-restraint and coop-
eration created a sense of social solidarity that encouraged law-abiding and 
even altruistic behavior (Herman 2006: 392–396).
8
This article argues that, contrary to the standard accounts, the Athenian 
courts played a vital role in maintaining law and order in classical Athens. I con-
tend that the courts may have had a substantial impact on Athenian behavior 
despite the ad hoc nature and inherent unpredictability and inscrutability of 
individual court verdicts. While the Athenian courts did not reliably and pre-
dictably enforce the laws under which cases were brought, the courts did, in the 
aggregate, enforce norms. Many of these norms were informal social norms, not 
subject to explicit legal regulation: norms relating to the treatment of friends 
and family and private sexual conduct, for example. Other norms enforced by 
the courts were the subject of statutes, but were unrelated to the charge in the 
case. I refer to the norms enforced by the courts as “extra-statutory norms,” 
meaning that they were unrelated to the statute at issue in the case in which 
they were raised, though some of these norms were the subject of other statutes. 
The sheer volume of litigation and routine legal proceedings such as citizenship 
hearings meant that the average Athenian could anticipate being involved in a 
legal proceeding far more often than someone living in contemporary Western 
7  Similarly, Karayiannis and Hatzis (2008, 3) emphasize the importance of informal mecha-
nisms such as moral education and stigma in creating the necessary trust to reduce transaction 
costs. 
8  Herman does suggest that coercive force was an important factor in compliance with law. Her-
man presents the creative but unsubstantiated claim that the implicit threat of enforcement 
by armed citizens (the hoplites) played a role in compliance with law. For criticisms of this 
argument, see Christ 2007; Lanni 2008. 
4
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society, and that during this hearing the jury would very likely consider aspects 
of his character and past behavior unrelated to the dispute. As a result, the court 
system played an interesting disciplinary role, providing concrete incentives to 
conform to a host of social norms.
This article also argues that the Athenian courts’ peculiar approach to 
norm enforcement compensated for apparent weaknesses in the Athenian 
apparatus of coercion. Many of the norms the Athenians sought to enforce 
were not easily reducible to specific rules. The Athenian approach also com-
pensated for difficulties in legal enforcement. The Athenians’ private prose-
cution system resulted in systematic underenforcement of laws, particularly 
“victimless” offenses and offenses committed against victims who lacked the 
resources to bring suit. By permitting any past norm violation to be used 
against a litigant at trial, the Athenian approach encouraged litigants to un-
cover and punish their opponents’ past violations. Third, court enforcement 
of extra-statutory norms permits a state to regulate behavior while main-
taining the fiction that it is not doing so. In the Athenian context, this meant 
that the Athenians could enforce a variety of social norms while maintain-
ing the fictions of voluntary devotion to military and public service
9 and of 
limited state interference in private conduct.
After providing some general background on the Athenian legal system 
for the non-specialist reader, I turn to a discussion of the use of extra-stat-
utory norms in Athenian courts. I then describe how the court system pro-
vided powerful concrete incentives to abide by extra-statutory norms. I also 
discuss how the enforcement of norms in the courts facilitated the use of in-
formal means of social control. I next compare the Athenian approach to the 
much more diffuse and indirect way in which modern courts enforce extra-
statutory norms. Finally, I outline the advantages of the Athenians’ peculiar 
style of norm enforcement in light of Athens’ values and institutions.
1. the atheNiaN leGal SYStem
The Athenian lawcourts are remarkably well-attested, at least by the stan-
dards of ancient history: roughly one hundred forensic speeches survive 
from the period between 420 and 323 B.C. (Ober 1989, 341–348 provides 
9  As I explain in more detail below, both military service and liturgies were required by law, but 
informal norms dictated service beyond the minimum requirements, and law court speakers 
regularly crow about their exceptional service.
6
7
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a catalogue).
10 These speeches represent not an official record of the trial 
proceedings, but the speech written by a speechwriter (logographos) for his 
client (or, in a few cases, for himself) and later published, possibly with mi-
nor revisions in some cases,
11 with a view to attracting future clients. 
Only speeches that were attributed to one of the ten Attic orators subse-
quently deemed canonical were preserved (Worthington 1994). As a result, 
the speeches in our corpus are atypical in the sense that they represent cases 
in which one of the litigants could secure the services of one of the best 
speechwriters in the city. We don’t know for certain whether and how the 
speeches of poor litigants might have differed from our surviving speeches. 
But literary accounts of litigation involving ordinary Athenians, for example 
in the comedies of Aristophanes, also refer to the use of extra-statutory ar-
gumentation (e.g. Ar.Vesp. 562–570). And it is important to note that the 
social class of the parties involved in the surviving cases are quite varied: 
we have, for example, cases involving a wealthy banker who was formerly 
a slave (Dem. 36), a man who admits that his family was so poorly off that 
his mother was reduced to selling ribbons in the agora (Dem. 57), an ac-
cusation against an admitted prostitute for impersonating a citizen (Dem. 
59), and, if the case is authentic, even a disabled man receiving the Athenian 
equivalent of social security payments (Lys. 24). The speeches in the corpus 
run the gamut from politically-charged treason trials and violent crimes to 
inheritance cases and property disputes between neighbors (Usher 1999). 
The opposing litigant’s speech survives in only a few cases, and we rarely 
learn of the outcome of the suit from other sources.
Athenian courts were largely, but not entirely, the province of adult male 
citizens. Foreigners and resident aliens were permitted to litigate in cer-
tain circumstances, most notably in commercial suits (MacDowell 1993, 
221–224; Patterson 2000; Todd 1993, 196; Whitehead 1978, 92–95). With a 
10  Plato’s Apology, by far the most famous Athenian court speech, is generally put in a different 
category from our surviving forensic speeches because the relationship between Plato’s account 
and the speech actually delivered by Socrates in court is unclear (for discussion see MacDowell 
1993, 201–02). I take a synchronic approach to the court speeches because the practices and 
procedures of the courts remained largely unchanged during the classical period, and because 
the data set of surviving speeches is small enough as it is. Nothing like the Athenian corpus of 
court speeches exists for other ancient Greek city-states.
11  Some scholars have argued that Demosthenes and Aeschines, for example, both revised their pub-
lished pieces in the case On the Crown in response to each other’s courtroom presentations (Yunis 
2001, 26–27). But any revisions appear to have been relatively minor (Yunis 2001, 27), and, as 
I discuss below, are unlikely to have departed from the general style of argumentation used in 
court. 
9
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few exceptions, slaves could serve neither as plaintiffs nor defendants (Todd 
1993, 187). When a slave was involved in a dispute, the case was brought 
by or against the slave’s owner. Similarly, women were forced to depend on 
their male legal guardians to act on their behalf in court (Todd 1993, 208).
In what the Athenians called “private cases” (dikai), the victim (or his 
family in the case of murder) brought suit. In “public cases” (graphai), 
any adult male citizen was permitted to initiate an action, though in our 
surviving graphai the prosecutor tends to be the primary party in inter-
est or at least a personal enemy of the defendant with something to gain 
by his conviction.
12 The provision of generalized standing in public cases 
brought with it the potential for abuse. To prevent vexatious litigation, the 
Athenians imposed penalties on volunteer prosecutors who dropped their 
case or failed to gain one-fifth of the jurors’ votes at trial (Harris 1999).
I focus in this article on the popular courts, the largest jurisdiction in 
the Athenian legal system.
13 With few exceptions, litigants were required to 
deliver their own speeches to the jury.
14 Each Athenian litigant was allotted 
a fixed amount of time to present his case. Some private cases were com-
pleted in less than an hour, and no trial lasted longer than a day.
15 Although 
a magistrate chosen by lot presided over each popular court, he did not 
interrupt the speaker for any reason or permit anyone else to raise legal 
objections, and did not even instruct the jury as to the relevant laws. 
Cases in the popular courts were heard by juries
16 chosen by lot from 
adult male citizens and generally ranged from 201 to 501 in size (Hansen 
1999, 187). A simple majority vote of the jury, taken without deliberation, 
12  Although no ancient source explains the distinction between graphai and dikai, graphai seem 
to have been cases regarded as affecting the community at large. This division is not quite the 
same as the modern criminal-civil distinction; murder, for example, was a dike because it was 
considered a crime against the family rather than the state (Todd 1993, 102–109).
13  Homicide and maritime cases followed somewhat different procedures and, most importantly, 
may have had a more developed concept of relevance (Lanni 2006, 75–114, 149–174).
14  A litigant could donate some of his time to another speaker (for an in-depth study of the use 
of supporting speakers in Athenian courts, see Rubinstein 2000).
15  A public suit was allotted an entire day (Ath.Pol. 53.3). Private cases varied according to the 
seriousness of the charge and were timed by a water-clock. MacDowell 1993, 249–50 estimates 
the length of various types of suit based on the one surviving water-clock. 
16  I have been using the term “jurors” as a translation for the Greek dikastai to refer to the audi-
ence of these forensic speeches, but some scholars (e.g. Harris 1994, 136) prefer the translation 
“judges.” Neither English word is entirely satisfactory, since these men performed functions 
similar to those both of a modern judge and a modern jury. I refer to dikastai as jurors to avoid 
the connotations of professionalism that the word judges conjures up in the modern mind.
11
12
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determined the outcome of the trial. No reasons for the verdict were given, 
and there was no provision for appeal.
17
There was no process like our voir dire, meant to exclude from the jury 
those with some knowledge of the litigants or the case. On the contrary, 
Athenian litigants at times encouraged jurors to base their decision on pre-
existing knowledge.
18 But the Athenian jury was not, for the most part, self-
informing: a few jurors or spectators might know the parties (e.g. Dem. 
30.32), but many would not. With approximately 30,000 adult male citizens 
and a total population of about 300,000 (Hansen 1999, 90–93), Athens was 
neither a face-to-face or close-knit society, nor was it a completely imper-
sonal metropolis (Ober 2007, 12). A citizen would likely know many of the 
residents of his local deme (village), particularly in rural areas (Osborne 
1985b; Whitehead 1986). But he would need to mix with members of the 
larger population whom he would not necessarily know on a regular basis 
both to obtain goods and services only available in the city (Harris 2002, 
72–74), and to participate in Athens’ religious, political, military, and legal 
institutions (Ober 2008b, 74; Osborne 1985b). 
I will be arguing below that the popular courts enforced a variety of 
extra-statutory norms. Arguments based on extra-statutory norms could 
influence jury verdicts, in part, because Athenian jurors did not feel con-
strained to strictly apply the statute under which the case was brought.
19 
The treatment of law in our surviving speeches is consistent with Aristotle’s 
characterization of laws as a form of evidence, similar to contracts and wit-
ness testimony, rather than as a decisive guide to a verdict (Ar. Rhet. 1.15). 
The Athenian laws were inscribed on stone stelai in various public areas of 
Athens. Litigants were responsible for finding and quoting any laws they 
thought helped their case, though there was no obligation to explain the 
17  A dissatisfied litigant might, however, indirectly attack the judgment by means of a suit for 
false witness or might bring a new case, ostensibly involving a different incident and/or using 
a different procedure. Some of our surviving speeches point explicitly to a protracted series of 
connected legal confrontations (Osborne 1985).
18  See, e.g., Aesch.1.93 (“First, let nothing be more persuasive for you than what you yourselves 
know and believe concerning Timarchus [the defendant] here. Examine the issue not from the 
present but from the past. For the statements made in the past about Timarchus and about what 
this man is accustomed to doing were made with a view toward the truth, while those that are 
going to be spoken today are for the purpose of deceiving you in order to get a decision. Cast 
your ballot according to the longer time and the truth and the facts you yourselves know.”)
19  For fuller discussion, see Lanni 2006,41–74. Although others have reached a similar conclusion, 
(e.g. Christ 1998, 193–224), some disagree (e.g. Rhodes 2004; Harris 2000).
14
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relevant laws. Rather than focus on the elements of the particular charge 
at issue and apply them to the facts of the case, Athenian litigants at times 
cite an array of laws that do not govern the charges in the case,
20 and at 
other times do not deem it relevant to discuss—or even mention—the law 
under which the suit was brought (e.g., Lys. 30, Hyp. 3). Even discussions 
of the specific charge at issue left much to the discretion of the jury because 
Athenian laws were, by our standards, shockingly vague. As is often pointed 
out, Athenian laws generally do not define the crime or describe the essen-
tial characteristics of behavior governed by the law (Cohen 1991, 204–210). 
In many cases, the primary purpose of the relevant law may have been to 
set out a procedure for bringing a case to court. The jury then attempted to 
arrive at a just verdict without focusing exclusively on determining whether 
the defendant’s behavior satisfied the formal criteria of the specific charge 
at hand. 
While the punishment for some offenses was set by statute, in many 
cases the jury was required to choose between the penalties suggested 
by each party in a second speech (Todd 1993, 133–135). Unlike modern 
jurors, Athenian jurors were generally made aware at the guilt phase of 
the statutory penalty or the penalty the prosecutor intended to propose 
if he won the case. For this reason, the guilt decision often incorporated 
considerations typically limited to sentencing in modern courts, includ-
ing questions of the defendant’s character and past convictions (Lanni 
2006, 53–59). 
Imprisonment was rarely, if ever, used as a punishment (Hunter 1997); 
the most common types of penalties in public suits were monetary fines, 
loss of citizen status (atimia), exile, and execution (Todd 1993, 139–144; 
2000a; Allen 2000, 197–243; Debrunner Hall 1996). With some exceptions, 
the fine in a public suit was paid to the city.
21 In most private cases damages 
were paid to the prosecutor, though the penalties for some dikai included 
public fines in addition to compensation (MacDowell 1993, 257). 
20  Speakers sometimes cite laws to bolster their portrayal of the character of the parties (DeB-
rauw 2001–2002), or to give the general impression that their position is supported by the laws 
(Carey 1996, 44–45). Ford 1999 provides a case study of the use of law in Aeschines’ Against 
Timarchus. He notes that the discussion of the law at issue, which accounts for only one-sixth 
of the speech (1.28–32), is surrounded by a number of laws irrelevant to the charge but useful 
in constructing an image of the education and moral character of a proper orator that can be 
contrasted with the record and character of the speaker’s opponent (Ford 1999, 241).
21  In some special procedures, such as phasis and apographe, the prosecutor was entitled to a por-
tion of the fine collected (MacDowell 1993, 257).
16
17700  ~  Lanni: Social Norms in the Courts of Ancient Athens
2. NormS iN court
There appears to have been no rule setting forth the range and types of 
information  and  argument  appropriate  for  popular  court  speeches.
22 
Speakers were limited only by the time limit and their own sense of which 
arguments were likely to persuade the jury. Arguments based on extra-
statutory norms appear again and again in the speeches, indicating that 
speechwriters believed that jurors would be influenced by such arguments. 
By “extra-statutory norms” I mean norms that were unrelated to the legal 
charge in the given case: bringing up an opponent’s bribery conviction 
in an inheritance case, or boasting of one’s public services or devotion to 
family in an assault case, for example. To be sure, Athenian jurors probably 
perceived discussion of these norms as character evidence relevant to de-
ciding whether the defendant had committed the act charged, or whether 
he deserved the prescribed or suggested penalty, or both (Lanni 2006, 59–
64). An Athenian litigant or juror would not perceive statutory and extra-
statutory arguments as fundamentally different in character or effect.
23 By 
labeling these norms “extra-statutory” I am simply highlighting the fact 
that Athenian verdicts appear to have often turned not on evidence about 
whether the defendant’s behavior had or had not met the criteria for the 
charge, but rather on evidence about whether one or other of the litigants 
had or had not adhered to norms unrelated to the dispute. What is impor-
tant for our purposes is that the norm enforced by a verdict was often not 
the law under which the case was brought. 
To give an idea of the content of the norms enforced by Athenian courts, 
I would like to briefly review six general categories of extra-statutory norms 
cited by Athenian litigants with particular frequency: (1) treatment of fam-
ily and friends; (2) moderation in the face of conflict; (3) honesty and fair 
dealing in business affairs; (4) loyalty and service to the city; (5) adherence 
to norms of private conduct, particularly sexual mores; and (6) obedience 
22  The Athenaion Politeia (67.1) refers to an oath to speak to the point taken by litigants in private 
cases, but this oath is never mentioned in our surviving popular court speeches, and if in fact 
it existed, it appears to have had no effect (for discussion, see Lanni 2005, 113 and n.4). 
23  However, the treatment of statutory and extra-statutory arguments in the popular courts was 
not entirely symmetrical: law court speakers do not explicitly urge the jurors to ignore the law 
in favor of other considerations; rather, they typically argue that both law and justice support 
their claim (Lanni 2006, 72–73). 
18
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to laws unrelated to the subject of the dispute.
24 Some of these norms were 
purely informal. Others were subject to legal regulation, but were used by 
speakers in cases involving unrelated statutes. For example, legal proce-
dures were available against those who violated the law banning desertion 
from military service. Litigants in suits about completely unrelated matters 
eagerly exploit any opportunity to argue that their opponents had contra-
vened these norms. 
A quick word on methodology is in order before we take a closer look 
at how the six categories of extra-statutory norms arise in our surviving 
speeches. Since we rarely know the outcome of an Athenian case, it is im-
possible to say whether a particular speech was considered persuasive. Even 
in the few cases where we do know the outcome, the absence of reasons for 
the jury’s verdict makes it difficult to discern which arguments swayed the 
jury. Kenneth Dover long ago laid out the standard approach for dealing with 
these difficult rhetorical sources: a litigant who wished to be successful would 
presumably limit himself to statements and arguments that were likely to be 
accepted by a jury (Dover 1974, 8–14). Legal arguments may be self-serving, 
but they generally remain within the realm of plausibility. When particular 
types of arguments are used many times over by different speechwriters in a 
wide array of cases, as they are in the case of our extra-statutory norms, we 
can surmise that these arguments were thought to be persuasive.
25 
2.1.   treatment of family and friends
Perhaps the most well-entrenched norms in Athenian society related to the 
obligations of philia (“friendship”). Philia does not correspond to modern 
24  Although discussion of these extra-statutory norms were common topoi, and their use was 
influenced to some degree by the requirements of genre and jurors’ expectations, speakers 
did not present generalized “stock” characters and arguments. Instead, they presented highly 
individualized arguments based on the specific character of the parties (Lanni 2006, 46–64).
25  There is no reason to think that the (possibly revised) published versions of our speeches are 
more likely to contain references to extra-statutory norms than the speeches actually deliv-
ered in court. Speechwriters published speeches to attract future clients; they may have been 
tempted to respond to persuasive counter-arguments that were raised in court, but they had no 
incentive to misrepresent the types of argumentation used. A handful of speeches in political 
cases were written, delivered, and presumably published by famous politicians such as Demos-
thenes or Aeschines. These authors may have had more of an incentive to expand on references 
to their good character in the written version to enhance their public reputations, but these 
texts do not make more use of extra-statutory argumentation than our other surviving court 
speeches, and in any case they represent a very small proportion of our corpus. Moreover, sev-
eral sources, both legal and non-legal, comment on the tendency of Athenian court speakers to 
resort to extra-statutory arguments (e.g., Ar. Vesp. 562–570; Pl. Apol. 35a-b).
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ideas of friendship. It encompassed a variety of relationships, including (from 
strongest  to  weakest)  immediate  family,  kin,  friend,  neighbor,  demesman 
(roughly, “fellow villager”), and even fellow-citizen, and included the recipro-
cal duties and obligations that accompanied each of these relations and dif-
fered according to the strength of the relational tie (Ar. NE 1165a. 14–35; Kon-
stan 1997, 53–59; Millett 1991, 110–114). One was expected to offer assistance 
in times of emergency or shortage to those with whom one shared a bond of 
philia (Dem. 53.4; Lys. 1.14; Din. 2.9; Ar. Nub. 1214, 1322; Xen. Mem. II.2.12). 
A few of these obligations were regulated by statute: for example, it was illegal 
to mistreat one’s parents or grandparents by failing to provide food or hous-
ing in their old age, physically abusing them, or failing to provide them with a 
proper funeral (Lys. 13.91; Aesch. 1.28; Dem. 24.103; Ath. Pol. 56.6). But most 
of the norms relating to proper treatment of neighbors, friends, and relatives 
were purely informal and of a vague and general character.
The surviving court speeches include many discussions of the litigants’ 
treatment of friends, neighbors, and relatives. Discussion of these norms 
appear in legal disputes of all sorts, from charges of political corruption 
(e.g., Din. 2.8, 11, 14) to inheritance disputes (e.g., Is 5. 39–40). Litigants 
commonly describe how they dutifully took care of their female relatives 
(e.g., Lys. 16.10; Is. 10.25) and charge that their adversary mistreated his 
parents or other close kin (e.g., Dem. 24.107, 201; 25.54–5; Din. 2.8; Lys. 
10.1–3; Lys. 14.28; 32.9, 11–18; Is. 5.39–40; 8.41; Aesch. 1.102–4; 3.77–78). 
The prosecutor charging the defendant with being a state debtor in Against 
Aristogeiton provides a long list of the defendants’ violations of these norms: 
he charges that Aristogeiton failed to bail his father out of prison, refused 
to pay for his subsequent burial, physically abused his mother, and even 
sold his own sister into slavery (Dem. 25.53–55). Similarly, speakers em-
phasize their generosity toward friends and neighbors and their opponents’ 
disloyalty (Ant. 2.2,12; Lys. 19.56; Is. 5.35, 40, 43; Lys. 6.23, 12.67; Dem. 
25.26–28; 37.15; Aesch. 2.22, 55). To continue with the example of Against 
Aristogeiton, the prosecutor recounts that Aristogeiton so completely and 
routinely flouted the norms of friendship, according to the prosecutor, that 
even his fellow criminals in prison voted to shun him (Dem. 25.61–62). 
2.2. moderation in the face of conflict
The second category of informal norms that arises in the speeches is the ob-
ligation to act in a moderate and reasonable way when faced with conflict. 
Gabriel Herman (2006, 159–175, 190–202, 402–414) and Michael Gagarin 
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(2002) have recently observed that Athenian litigants present themselves as 
abiding by an ethic of self-restraint: in several cases speakers boast that they 
endured multiple insults and violent injuries from their opponents without 
retaliating.
26 Speakers also charge their opponents with being litigious and 
emphasize that they themselves are unaccustomed to being involved in legal 
disputes (e.g., Dem. 54.24). This norm also arises in the context of how the 
litigants have conducted themselves in the course of the litigation. Speakers 
routinely claim that they were reluctant to litigate and would have preferred to 
settle the dispute amicably or through arbitration, and allege that the suit only 
reached the trial court because of their opponent’s stubbornness or aggres-
siveness (Dem. 21.74; 27.1; 29.58; 30.2; 40.1–2; 41.14–15; 42.11–12; 44.31–2; 
47.81; 48.2,40; 54.24; Lyc. 1.16; Lys. 3.3; 9.7; Is. 5.28–30; for discussion see 
Hunter 1994, 57; Dover 1994, 187–192).
27 
2.3. honesty and fair Dealing in Business affairs
A third category of extra-statutory norms is honesty and fair dealing in 
business relationships. Speakers frequently bring up their general reputa-
tions for fair dealing and good business practices quite apart from the de-
tails of the deal in question with the expectation that this evidence will 
influence jurors. To cite just one example, the speaker in Demosthenes 37, a 
case involving a series of mining contracts, expresses fear that his case will 
be prejudiced by his opponent’s arguments that he is a money-lender and 
therefore presumptively dishonest, and presents witness testimony “regard-
ing what sort of person I am toward men who lend money on bond and 
toward those in need” (Dem. 37.52–54. Other examples: Dem. 35.1, 17–25; 
36.55–58; 45.68; 49.1–2; Is. 5.40). The fact that litigants were expected to 
speak for themselves in court may have provided valuable demeanor evi-
dence to help the jury evaluate all types of character arguments, but par-
ticularly those involving honesty and fair dealing.
28 
26  E.g. Lys. 3.9: “I chose not to exact justice for these crimes rather than have the people think me 
to be unreasonable.” 
27  One litigant claims that he was willing to accept a settlement that was less than fair to avoid 
litigation: “we agreed [to a settlement], not because we were ignorant of what was just in light 
of the contract, but because we thought that we should compromise a bit and yield so that we 
not be thought litigious.” (Dem. 56.14). Demosthenes 57 offers an example of the speaker’s 
contrasting his own restraint in pursuing his claim with his opponent’s violent and inappro-
priate use of self-help (Lanni 2006, 49). 
28  In fact, speechwriters attempted to write their speeches in a way that helped the speaker make a 
positive impression on the jury through the use of ethos and dramatic characterization (Carey 
1994, 34–43).
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2.4. loyalty and Service to the city
Litigants’ claims of loyalty and public service are perhaps the most interesting 
for our purposes because they provide the most blatant example of discus-
sion of norms unrelated to the legal charge in the case. The epilogue of many 
of our forensic speeches includes a list of the speaker’s (and his family’s) ser-
vices to the city and criticisms of his opponent for insufficient or deficient 
public service (e.g., Ant. 5.74; Andoc. 1.141–149; Lys. 6.46; 7.31; 16.18; 18.2; 
20.23; 25.12; Is. 4.27; 5.36; 7.37–41; Dem. 21.161–162; 25.78; 54.44). As sever-
al scholars have pointed out, litigants were sometimes quite forthright about 
their expectation that the jury will find for them out of gratitude (charis) for 
their public services (Christ 2006, 172–181; Johnstone 1999, 100–108; Ober 
1989, 226–230; Whitehead 1983). Typical is the rhetoric used by a defendant 
in a public corruption case. He lists various public dramatic competitions 
that he sponsored and describes his naval exploits during the Peloponnesian 
War. He then suggests that the evidence of his public-spiritedness should de-
termine the verdict: “having put myself in danger defending you and com-
pleted so many services for the city, I am not seeking a reward like other men 
do, but simply that I not be deprived of my own property [through this suit]” 
(Lys. 21.11). 
The norms relating to public service took several forms. Most prominent 
in the speeches is the importance of performing liturgies, which involved 
paying for either a festival event, such as a tragic drama, or equipping a navy 
ship for a year (Christ 2006, 146–55; Gabrielsen 1994; Sinclair 1988, 54–64). 
Performance of liturgies was a legal requirement for wealthy citizens. A man 
seeking to avoid serving could seek one of several statutory exemptions,
29 
and could even bring a suit arguing that another, wealthier, citizen should 
perform in his stead.
30 Although liturgies were legally required, there was 
some flexibility in which liturgies to perform (some were much more expen-
sive than others), how often to participate, and how much money to spend. 
Informal norms encouraged citizens to go beyond the minimum require-
ment; litigants listing their public services tend to focus on high-priced lit-
urgies such as the triearchy, suggest that their service has entailed significant 
29  For example, there were limits on how often a citizen could be called to perform certain litur-
gies (Dem. 50.9; Ath. Pol. 56.3; Is. 7.38; for discussion, see Christ 2006, 151–153). 
30  Under the antidosis procedure, a man called to perform a liturgy could challenge an allegedly 
wealthier man to choose between carrying out the liturgy or exchanging his property with 
the challenger. If the man refused both options, the case would be brought to court to decide 
which should perform the liturgy (MacDowell 1993, 161–164). 
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financial sacrifice, and emphasize that they performed liturgies many times, 
implying that they volunteered to perform extra services.
31 Litigants also at-
tack their opponents for shirking liturgies or the taxes periodically assessed 
from the rich, or for performing their liturgies in a cheap or shoddy manner 
(Lys. 1.27–28; 6.46, 21.20; 26.21; 36.26; Is. 5.45; Dem. 21.154; 54.44; 42.22; 
Aesch. 1.101). 
While the norms surrounding liturgies and taxes applied only to wealthy lit-
igants, all citizens could boast about (or be attacked regarding) their approach 
to military service. Laws prohibited draft dodging, deserting the ranks, and 
other forms of cowardice (Lys. 14.5; Aesch. 3.175–176; Christ 2006, 118–124; 
Hamel 1998), but these laws were rarely enforced through lawsuits (Christ 
2006, 63, 133). Extra-statutory norms relating to military service, on the other 
hand, abound in our court cases. Speakers routinely boast of their (and their 
family’s) longstanding and courageous service in the military, and charge their 
opponents with draft evasion and cowardice (attacks on opponents for draft 
evasion: Lys. 6.46; 21.26; 30.26; Isoc. 18.47–48; Is. 4.27–29; 5.46; Dem. 54.44; 
boasts of hoplite service: Lys. 16.13; Is. 7.41; Aesch. 2.167–169). 
Loyalty to the democracy was another extra-statutory norm discussed in 
court cases. Athens suffered two short-lived oligarchic revolutions in 411 
and 404 B.C. (Hansen 1999, 40–43). Following the restoration of the de-
mocracy in 403 B.C., an amnesty was passed to protect citizens who had 
participated in the oligarchy (Ath. Pol. 39; Wolpert 2002, 29–47). Lawsuits 
based on actions taken prior to the restoration of the democracy were pro-
hibited, with two exceptions: certain high officials were exempted from the 
amnesty, and suits alleging murder committed with one’s own hands could 
go forward.(Ath. Pol. 39; Wolpert 2002, 29–47). Although the amnesty pro-
hibited prosecutions based on participation in the oligarchy, a citizen’s ac-
tions during the city’s political upheavals could help or hurt him in lawsuits 
arising out of unrelated matters. In the years following the revolutions, 
litigants regularly advertise their longstanding democratic sympathies and 
describe how they were forced into exile or otherwise harmed by the oligar-
chic revolts, and suggest that their opponents participated in the oligarchic 
revolutions or supported the oligarchic regime (e.g. Lys. 13.90; 18.10; 24.24; 
25.15; 26.5; 28.12; 30.15; for discussion see Wolpert 2002, 100–119). 
31  E.g., Lys. 21.1–5. 25; Lyc. 1.139–40; Lys. 3.47–8; Is. 4.27–29; 5.41–46; 7.37–41; Lys. 18.21,24–5; 
19.56–57. Lys. 19.9; 21.1–5; Dem. 38.26; 50.7. Christ 2006, 172–76 provides examples of speak-
ers describing the extra financial burden liturgies had placed on them; Christ 2006, 200–204 dis-
cusses how speakers sought to represent themselves as voluntarily performing public services.
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2.5. Norms of Private conduct 
The frequent use of attacks on an opponent’s private conduct is another of the 
more striking aspects of Athenian forensic oratory. We will see in Part 4.3 that 
the legal regulation of sexual activity appears to have been limited to behavior 
that was perceived to threaten public order. Yet litigants regularly charge their 
opponents with sexual deviance of all sorts (e.g., Aesch. 2.151; 3.238; And. 
1.100, 124–27; Lys. 13.66; 14.25–26; Is. 6.18–21; 8.44; Dem. 36.45). Litigants 
also  criticize  their  opponents  for  everything  from  extravagance  (Dem. 
21.133–34, 158; 36.45; 38.27; Aesch. 1.95–100; Din. 1.36), poor money 
management (Lys. 14.27; Aesch. 1.97–105; Din. 1.36; Is. 5.43), and drunk-
enness (Lys. 3.5–9; 24.25–29; 30.2; Dem. 38.27) to walking quickly and 
talking loudly (Dem. 37.52), and cite their own moderation and private 
virtue (Lys. 5.2; Andoc. 1.144–145; Isoc. 16.22–24; Is. 10.25). Aeschines’ 
personal attacks on Timarchus when prosecuting him under a law forbid-
ding former male prostitutes from speaking in the Assembly is particularly 
memorable: he charges that Timarchus squandered his family estate and 
“was a slave to the most shameful pleasures, fish-eating, extravagant dining, 
girl-pipers and escort-girls, dicing, and the other activities none of which 
ought to get the better of any man who is well-born and free” (Aesch. 1.42, 
trans. Fisher 2001).
32 The ubiquity of attacks on an opponent’s private be-
havior in our surviving speeches suggests that litigants expected these argu-
ments to affect the jurors’ verdict. 
2.6. legal Norms unrelated to the charge 
Legal norms other than the statute under which the case was brought are 
also frequently discussed by law court speakers. Litigants regularly empha-
size their own clean records and describe any prior crimes and/or convic-
tions of their opponents (e.g. Aesch. 1.59; 2.93; Din. 2.9ff; Lys. 6.21–32; 
13.64, 67; 18.14; Is. 4.28; 8.41; Dem. 21.19–23; 25.60–63; 34.36). Discus-
sions of past crimes are not limited to charges similar to the case at hand; 
any prior violation of the law by a litigant or his ancestors could be used 
against him. For example, when Alcibiades the Younger, the son of the fa-
mous general, was charged with deserting the ranks, his prosecutor provides 
a long list of his past crimes, including adultery and attempted murder, and 
recounts the treasonous behavior of his father. He then states, “In response 
32  On fish-eating as paradigmatic gluttonous behavior, see Fisher 2001, 174–175; Davidson 1998, 
3–35.
29
30Summer, 2009: Volume 1, Number 2  ~  Journal of Legal Analysis  ~  707   
to these acts it is fitting both for you and for future jurors to take vengeance 
on whomever of these men [i.e., the members of Alcibiades’ family] whom 
you catch” (Lys. 14.30–31). A litigant could help his case by exposing any 
bad acts or crimes committed by his opponent against anyone else in the 
past, even if the past act was completely unrelated to the current dispute. 
Similarly, anytime a litigant walked into court, he could wind up defending 
himself for any act he had committed in the past. The prosecutor in Against 
Aristogeiton, for example, explicitly argues that the jury should convict in 
part on the basis of the defendant’s past crimes, stating that he deserves the 
death penalty “on the basis of both his whole life and the things he has done 
now” (Din. 2.11). 
What I hope I’ve shown so far is that the extent to which a litigant had 
conformed to a wide variety of extra-statutory norms could influence his 
legal case. In essence, a litigant’s conduct over the course of his entire life 
was deemed relevant to the jurors’ decision. I’ve argued elsewhere that the 
Athenians’ broad approach to relevance in the popular courts reflected a 
conscious choice to embrace discretionary, individualized justice rather 
than a rule of law (Lanni 2006). That is, the prominence of extra-statutory 
norms in the court speeches reflects a distinctive Athenian notion of pro-
cedural and substantive justice. The balance of this article attempts to trace 
how this peculiar Athenian arrangement operated in practice to help main-
tain order in Athens. 
3.   eNforciNG NormS, Not StatuteS
What role did the extra-statutory norms play in Athenian verdicts? And 
what, if any, effect did the discussion of these norms in court have on 
Athenian social life? In this Part, I argue that the consideration of extra-
statutory norms in the courts created powerful incentives to abide by these 
norms. In this way, Athenian courts used a much more direct mechanism 
to enforce extra-statutory norms than modern courts. Athenian trials also 
facilitated informal enforcement of norms by publicizing norm violations 
and by serving as shaming ceremonies. 
3.1. unpredictable outcomes, Predictable arguments
We have seen that litigants treated statutes as a form of evidence rather than 
a decisive guide to a verdict. Some speakers made sophisticated legal argu-
ments, but others did not discuss the requirements of the statute under which 
31
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the case was brought. We have also seen that litigants regularly employed a 
variety of extra-statutory arguments in their court speeches. We do not have 
any explicit evidence about how jurors viewed their role, but the surviving 
speeches suggest that neither extra-statutory nor statutory arguments cat-
egorically took precedence in Athenian courts. Litigants could make very 
different choices about what types of evidence to include and emphasize in 
their speeches. The dispute over whether to award Demosthenes an honor-
ary crown, one of the few cases in which the speeches on both sides survive, 
illustrates the lack of consensus on the relative importance of statutory and 
extra-statutory argumentation. Aeschines, who failed to win even one-fifth 
of the jurors’ votes, opens his speech with a long discussion of the relevant 
laws,
33 while Demosthenes focuses on extra-statutory norms and responds to 
these legal arguments in a mere nine sections, shunted off to an inconspicu-
ous part of his speech.
34 Such a situation, in which the jurors are presented 
with two contrasting views of “the case,” each of which employs a radically 
different balance between legal and extra-statutory argumentation, suggests 
that neither form of argumentation was considered decisive or even superior 
to the other. How much credit to give the various legal and extra-statutory 
arguments was itself in dispute in each case. 
Similarly, multiple extra-statutory norms were often implicated in an 
Athenian case. The speaker in one inheritance suit, for example, charges his 
opponent
35 with violating several extra-statutory norms: he was a reluctant 
and stingy participant in liturgies, cheated and failed to support his rela-
tives, committed incest with his mother, and failed to repay debts to friends 
(Is. 5.34–40). The speaker, by contrast, boasts of his ancestors’ public ser-
vices, including triearchies and prize-winning choruses, and lists the people 
in his family who died defending Athens in war (Is. 5.40–44). The opposing 
speech does not survive; doubtless it also appealed to some combination of 
legal and extra-statutory norms. 
While it was not hard to anticipate how the jury might have reacted to 
each of these arguments in isolation, it was much less clear how a jury would 
33  Aesch. 3.8–48. Aeschines does also provide extensive discussion of Demonsthenes’ character.
34  Dem. 18.111–120. For discussion of which orator had the better legal case, compare Gwatkin 
1957 with Harris 1994, 141. Gagarin 2008 makes an intriguing argument that what mattered 
in public cases was the indictment, not the statute, and that therefore the discussion of Demos-
thenes’ character was a “legal” argument in Athenian terms. Even if this is correct, my point that 
the two speakers have very different conceptions of which issues are most central still stands.
35  Dicaeogenes is not technically the legal opponent in the case, but is the opponent in interest.
34
35Summer, 2009: Volume 1, Number 2  ~  Journal of Legal Analysis  ~  709   
weigh the multiple competing norms in any particular case. There was no 
consensus on a hierarchy of norms in Athenian society. This is most evident 
in Attic tragedy. Tragic dramas often dramatize a conflict of norms—to 
name the most famous example, duty to the family versus duty to the state 
in the Antigone—with no clear moral resolution. In the law courts, too, 
the jury was often presented with conflicting norms and left to decide on a 
case-by-case basis which arguments to credit.
Individual Athenian court verdicts were thus the result of many indi-
vidual jurors’ complicated weighing of a variety of factors, both statutory 
and extra-statutory. This form of ad hoc, multi-factored decision-making 
meant that the courts rarely enforced the statute under which the case was 
brought in a straightforward or predictable manner. Because multiple stat-
utory and extra-statutory norms were at play in most cases, the expressive 
meaning of an Athenian verdict was often unclear. Any decision could be 
interpreted in various ways, depending on which legal or extra-statutory 
norm one thought played the most important role in the jury’s decision. 
Most importantly, the formal rules embodied in statutes provided little 
guidance on how a suit under the law would be resolved, and therefore 
created a relatively weak direct incentive to comply with the law. This was 
particularly true where the potential benefits of violating the law in a par-
ticular case were high.
36 
But it is important to distinguish here between predictability of outcomes 
as opposed to predictability of arguments. While it may have been difficult 
to anticipate the ultimate verdict in an individual case, there was no ques-
tion that adherence or non-adherence to particular extra-statutory norms 
would tend to help or hurt one’s case, to a far greater degree than in society 
today. Ordinary Athenians as well as professional speechwriters were likely 
to be very familiar with the types of arguments used in the law courts. Not 
only did citizens serve on juries by the hundreds, but the courts were a 
form of public entertainment, frequently drawing spectators for ordinary 
as well as high-profile trials (Lanni 1997). Ordinary Athenians were aware 
that litigants who adhered to these well-known extra-statutory norms or 
whose opponent flouted them would be in a position to argue that these 
considerations should trump the legal issues raised in any dispute. To cite 
just one example, a litigant states: “I have before now seen defendants who 
36  In the contemporary context, Ellickson 1991 argues that high stakes are one factor that influ-
ences whether parties use formal or informal means of dispute resolution.
36
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were convicted by the facts themselves, and who were not able to show that 
they were not guilty, who were able to escape on account of their moderate 
and respectable lifestyles, others on account of the good deeds and litur-
gies of their ancestors, and other such things, leading the jurors to pity and 
compassion” (Dem. 25.76). Since extra-statutory norms could become an 
issue in any suit, regardless of its subject matter, Athenian court verdicts, in 
the aggregate, had the effect of enforcing these extra-statutory norms. 
3.2. creating incentives to conform to extra-Statutory Norms
A decision based on a litigant’s conformity to informal norms had effects 
that reached beyond the case at hand. The likelihood that an Athenian might 
find himself involved in a legal proceeding in the future meant that the legal 
system created incentives to conform to extra-statutory norms for later use 
in court. Despite being ad hoc and unpredictable, court verdicts thus may 
have had a profound influence on Athenian social life. Athenian courts may 
have played a disciplinary role, enforcing not the statutes under which cases 
were brought, but a host of well-known extra-statutory norms. 
The prospect of being involved in some form of legal action where one’s 
past adherence to social norms might be of assistance was substantial. There 
was a great deal of litigation in Athens. The courts were in session about 
200 days a year, and were capable of hearing anywhere from four to as many 
as 40 cases a day, depending on the type of case.
37 Thucydides (1.77) tells 
us that foreigners called the Athenians philodikoi (“lovers of litigation”), 
and Athenian litigiousness is a common joke in Aristophanes’ comedies 
(Ar. Peace, 505; Clouds, 206–208; Wasps passim; Birds. 35–45). The high fre-
quency of Athenian litigation provides the premise for two of Aristophanes’ 
plays: the characters in the Birds establish a new city in the sky in large part 
to avoid the excessive litigation of Athens; and the protagonist of the Wasps 
is an old man addicted to jury service. The fact that private cases were sus-
pended at various times in the fourth century due to lack of funds to pay 
juries also suggests a large caseload (Dem. 39.17; 45.4). 
Classicists disagree about whether ordinary Athenians were regular law 
court speakers or whether the courts were dominated by an elite “litigating 
37  Hansen 1999, 186–187 estimates that the court met between 175 and 225 days a year; that dikai 
worth less than 1,000 drachmas could be completed in under an hour; and that up to four 
courts might be in session on any given day. Of course, the courts likely did not hear cases at 
their full capacity every day they were in session.
38
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class.”
38 Certainty on this point is impossible. But in my view Victor Bers 
(forthcoming) has convincingly argued that ordinary Athenians did litigate 
with some regularity. The poor greatly outnumbered the wealthy in Athens 
(Davies 1981, 35). It is hard to account for the high caseload if litigation was 
limited to members of the elite (Bers forthcoming). If we assume that the 
courts typically heard an average of only ten cases per court day, one-fourth 
of their capacity (Hansen 1999, 186–187), then roughly 4,000 litigants, 
drawn mostly from the citizen body of 30,000, would appear in court in an 
average year.
39 Despite the elite bias of our surviving speeches, two speeches 
appear to have been delivered by poor men.
40 Moreover, discussions of liti-
gation in the comedies of Aristophanes seem to suggest that litigation was 
not limited to the wealthy (Bers forthcoming).
41 
But even if it is true that only a small proportion of Athenians wound 
up litigating dikai or graphai to trial, the average Athenian still faced a high 
likelihood of being involved in some form of legal proceeding in which 
extra-statutory norms might play a role. Very small claims—roughly equiv-
alent to 4 to 10 days’ wages for a laborer—were heard and adjudicated by 
magistrates (Bers forthcoming; Todd 1993, 128). These magistrates were 
not legal experts. Like most Athenian officials, they were chosen by lot for 
one-year terms. There is no reason to think that arguments based on extra-
statutory norms would have any less influence in small claims adjudication 
than they did in the courts. In the fourth century, in an attempt to take 
some of the burden off the courts, private claims above the small claims 
limit were sent to mandatory but non-binding public arbitration prior to 
trial (Todd 1993, 187). All men were required to become public arbitrators 
once they retired from military service (Ath.Pol. 53.5), which suggests that 
the number of suits that reached at least this preliminary stage was very 
high. Extra-statutory norms presumably played a role in these arbitrations 
38  Bers (forthcoming) is particularly persuasive on this point; see also Rhodes 1998, 145. For the 
argument that the elite dominated litigation, see Christ 1998, 32–33.
39  Ten cases per day for 200 court days per year and two litigants per case yields 4,000 litigants.
40  Isoc 20.19; Lys 24.1. Some have questioned the authenticity of Lysias 24 (for discussion, see 
Todd 2000b, 253–254). While it is true that prosecutors may have had little to gain financially 
by bringing private cases against poor men, many Athenian litigants appear to have been mo-
tivated by interests other than money, such as revenge, and of course in most public cases any 
fines collected went to the state in any case (on the motivation of Athenian litigants, see Christ 
1998, 34–36, 118–159).
41  To give just one example, there is a reference in the Wasps to Philocleon, the poor juror, having 
brought lawsuits in the past.
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just as in the courts. In fact, Aristotle in the Rhetoric (1374b) suggests that 
arbitrators were less bound by the law and more influenced by notions of 
fairness than jurors in the courts.
42 
In addition to lawsuits arising from disputes, every male citizen was sub-
ject to an examination before a public body at which their character might 
become an issue. At the age of eighteen each boy was presented to his deme 
(roughly, “village”) assembly for a vote on whether to register him as a citi-
zen (Todd 1993, 179–181). Periodically, worries that aliens had infiltrated 
the rolls led the city to order the demes to re-qualify each citizen by vote 
(Todd 1993, 180). Presumably many of these votes were pro forma, but per-
sonal enemies of a candidate or his family could make trouble (e.g., Dem. 
57). A candidate who was denied or stripped of citizenship had the option 
of appealing to a court for a final decision (Todd 1998, 180–181; Harrison 
1998, 207–208). The formal criteria for citizenship were age and parent-
age (Todd 1993, 180–181), neither of which was easy to prove definitively 
in an age without detailed record-keeping (Scafuro 1994). Moreover, our 
one surviving case involving disputed citizenship indicates that at both the 
deme and court level adherence to extra-statutory norms could influence 
one’s case: the speaker recounts how he was voted honors while serving as a 
demarch, lists ancestors who had died fighting for the city, and suggests that 
his opponent’s business practices were notorious (Dem. 57.11, 33, 36–38, 
63–65). 
All magistrates also faced a public scrutiny before taking office (doki-
masia) and an accounting when leaving office (euthyna) (Todd 1993, 126, 
285–289; Harrison 1998, 200–210). The dokimasia procedure for the vari-
ous magistrates differed somewhat. It seems that archons (the most power-
ful magistrates) faced a double scrutiny, first in the Council and then by a 
popular court, while Council members faced a scrutiny by the Council with 
the possibility of appeal to a court, and all other magistrates were subject 
simply to a public hearing in court (Ath. Pol. 45.3; 55.2–4; Rhodes 1981, 
615–617; Harrison 1998, 200–203). The requirements of the dokimasia in-
vited discussion of the candidate’s adherence to extra-statutory norms: ac-
cording to the Constitution of the Athenians, a candidate was expected to put 
on evidence showing not only that he was a citizen, but also that he treated 
42  Scafuro 1997, 137 points out that arbitrations, unlike court speeches, had no time limit, and 
notes that “we are not likely to insist that arbitral procedures required a stricter adherence to 
lawful criteria than cases presented before a dikasterion.”
42
43Summer, 2009: Volume 1, Number 2  ~  Journal of Legal Analysis  ~  713   
his parents well, paid his taxes, and had performed military service (Ath. 
Pol. 55.3).
43 As has often been pointed out, our surviving dokimasia speech-
es indicate that these procedures typically went far beyond establishing the 
formal requirements of office (Rhodes 1981, 472; MacDowell 1993, 168; 
Hunter 1994, 106–109). For example, the defendant in a dokimasia states 
that he intends “to render an account of [his] whole life,” and proceeds to 
describe his generosity with his siblings, his disdain for dice and drinking, 
the fact that he has never been named in a lawsuit, and his bravery in mili-
tary service on several campaigns (Lys. 16.9–21). All magistrates were also 
subject to a public accounting as they left office. As part of this procedure, 
any citizen could present a written complaint to an official about a depart-
ing magistrate’s conduct in office; if the official thought that the charge was 
legitimate, the case was referred to court (MacDowell 1993, 171). 
The high likelihood that an Athenian would find himself involved in a 
public hearing where his adherence to extra-statutory norms might mat-
ter becomes clear when we realize that most citizens held public office at 
some point in their lives. There was in the range of 1200 officials (Hansen 
1999, 341), out of a total adult male citizen population of perhaps 30,000 
(Hansen 1999, 90–93), many of whom were chosen by lot for only one-year 
terms. Hansen has estimated that with respect to service on the Council 
alone, “over a third of all citizens over eighteen, and about two thirds of all 
citizens over forty, became councillors, some of them twice” (Hansen 1999, 
249). The speaker in Against Eubulides, the citizenship case mentioned 
earlier, illustrates how often a seemingly ordinary Athenian might find his 
character the subject of public scrutiny: In addition to his registration as a 
citizen at 18, he also faced a deme and court hearing about his citizenship 
when his deme revised its rolls, and a dokimasia when he was chosen by lot 
for a priestly office (Dem. 57.62). 
It therefore seems fair to say that the average Athenian could anticipate 
that he might find himself involved in legal proceedings during which his 
character might become an issue, whether they took the form of trials in 
a private or public lawsuit or other legal procedures such as small claims 
hearings, arbitrations, citizenship registration, or public scrutiny and ac-
counting of magistrates. As a result, he had strong incentives to adhere 
to well-known social norms so that he could point to these facts to help 
support his case. Similarly, any opponent or accuser in these proceedings 
43  Like the citizenship enrollment procedure, most of these hearings were probably routine.
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could use his failure to abide by these and other norms against him. It is 
important to emphasize that the incentives to conform were all the greater 
because litigants were not limited to violations of extra-statutory norms 
that were related in some way to the subject matter of the suit or that were 
committed against the opposing party. Any bad act against any party, how-
ever unrelated, could be used against a man in any future case. And a liti-
gant could call upon any good act to help bail him out of any sort of legal 
trouble. 
Did this system simply create incentives for litigants to lie about their 
opponents’ and their own character and past record in court without ac-
tually affecting behavior? There were several mechanisms to limit these 
types of misrepresentations in court. Witnesses who affirmed a litigant’s 
statements could be prosecuted for providing false testimony; a third such 
conviction led to loss of citizenship (MacDowell 1993, 244–245). A litigant 
who wanted to advance baseless claims would have to find witnesses who 
were willing to put themselves at serious risk to help his case. Moreover, ju-
ries numbered in the hundreds, increasing the chances that someone on the 
jury or among the spectators would be familiar with the litigants’ reputa-
tions and past actions. One litigant, for example, assumes that at least some 
of the jurors and spectators will be familiar with his opponent’s previous 
conviction: “these facts are widely acknowledged, as those who served as 
jurors at that time and many of the spectators know well” (Dem. 30.32; 
for discussion of knowledgeable spectators watching trials see Lanni 1997, 
188). Litigants regularly asked jurors and spectators to interrupt their op-
ponents by shouting out when they made controversial claims; in fact, the 
Athenians had a term for this phenomenon, thorubos (Lanni 1997; Bers 
1985). Aeschines recounts an incident where his opponent in a treason case 
tried to falsely accuse him of having committed hubris against a woman, 
but the jury shouted him down on account of his good reputation. He adds, 
“I think that this is my reward for having lived a moderate life” (Aesch. 
2.4–5). One speaker suggests that the potential for mischaracterization and 
exaggeration by opponents may have provided an even greater incentive to 
lead a life beyond reproach: “For the decent man’s life should be so clean 
that it does not even allow the suspicion of blameworthy conduct” (Aesch. 
1.48, trans. Carey 2000). 
One might also wonder why there was so much litigation in Athens if 
the accumulation of incentives I describe led to a well-ordered society. The 
Athenians appear to have been an extremely litigious people by modern 
46
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standards. Bringing a lawsuit could enhance one’s public reputation and 
jump-start a political career, and even for non-elites the courts provided 
a forum for status-competition; some prosecutions may have been moti-
vated as much by these concerns as by a feeling that a serious breach of 
the peace or injury had occurred.
44 It is also true that litigation was, in 
comparison to modern standards, extraordinarily cheap and easy. We see 
a similar pattern of extreme litigiousness in many societies where the right 
and practical access to legal process, particularly legal process against one’s 
social and economic superiors, is relatively new (Mann 1987; Stern 1993; 
Taylor 1979; Borah 1983). But this litigiousness does not necessarily reflect 
a lack of social order: a high level of both litigation and order characterized 
the New England colonies, for example (Mann 1987, 19; Zuckerman 1970, 
48–50; Nelson 1975, 1–10). A pessimistic interpretation might be that the 
members of these societies had not yet figured out how rarely litigation 
results in satisfaction. 
At first blush it might seem far-fetched to think that Athenians would 
alter their behavior in anticipation that it might sway a future court in their 
favor. But at least with respect to the performance of public services such as 
liturgies, litigants could be quite explicit that they were motivated to per-
form services in part because they thought it might help them in future 
lawsuits. In fact, the notion that one performs public service with the ex-
pectation of receiving charis (“gratitude”) from the jurors is a common 
topos in our surviving court speeches (Christ 2006, 172–181; Johnstone 
1999, 100–108; Ober 1989, 226–230; Whitehead 1983). One speaker, for 
example, lists his public services (four triearchies, service in four naval bat-
tles, and contributions to several war levies) and then baldly states that he 
performed public service for use in later court cases: “I spent more than 
was required by the city in order that I might be thought better of by you, 
so that if I happened to suffer any misfortune I would be in a better posi-
tion to defend myself in court” (Lys. 25.13).
45 Litigants don’t make similar 
statements about their adherence to the other categories of social norms, 
but that is not surprising. While a litigant might admit without too much 
44  Like Christ (1998, 34–36), I believe that prestige was an important, but not the only, motiva-
tion for litigation.
45  Another example: the speaker in Lysias, For Polystratus explains his motivation for public ser-
vice: “the reason we treated you well was not to receive money, but so that if we were ever in 
trouble, you would grant our request for acquittal as a fitting reward.” (Lys. 20.31, trans. Todd 
200b).
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shame his hope that generosity to the state would be repaid down the line, 
a litigant would have to be more circumspect in recasting his honesty or his 
fidelity to friends in terms of ulterior motives, because in such instances the 
ulterior motive was antithetical to the norm itself. 
Of course, this is only anecdotal evidence that this mechanism of enforc-
ing extra-statutory norms though the legal system influenced behavior. We 
can no more prove that Athenians obeyed extra-statutory norms in part 
because of their enforcement through the legal system than we can say, in 
the absence of hard data, that any modern statute’s sanctions actually cause 
compliance. We simply don’t have enough data to say for certain whether 
any compliance with these extra-statutory norms should be attributed to 
the mechanism of norm enforcement described here as opposed to infor-
mal social sanctions, internalized value systems, or, for those norms that 
were also the subject of legal regulation, direct legal sanctions. 
It is likely that all these mechanisms played an important role in compli-
ance. But the system of private prosecution may have made formal legal 
sanctions less certain, and therefore less effective, than they are in many 
other societies. And these norms may not have been as deeply internalized 
by all citizens as one might expect in such a small, relatively homogenous 
society. Athens had no system of public education, and the sophistic revo-
lution of the fifth century cast doubt on even the most basic cultural norms 
such as filial piety. For example, the scene in Aristophanes’ Clouds (1303–
1475) in which a son beats his father and defends his actions at length on 
the basis of doctrines he learned in Socrates’ “reflectory” is certainly exag-
gerated, but must contain a kernel of truth for the joke to work. Conversely, 
cooperative norms of honesty, fair dealing, and moderation in the face of 
conflict appear to have been of recent vintage, part of the transition from a 
tribal Homeric society to a polis community: in the Homeric poems (par-
ticularly in the figure of Odysseus), trickery, lying, and relentless pursuit 
of advantage were celebrated, and it has been pointed out that the term 
aischron (disgraceful) began to be regularly associated with deception only 
in the late fifth century (Adkins 1975, 172).
What is clear from our evidence is that the Athenian mode of norm en-
forcement provided surprisingly strong incentives for Athenians to con-
form to social norms, over and above any incentives generated by informal 
social sanctions or internalized value systems. And, at least with respect to 
liturgies, some Athenian litigants report that they altered their behavior in 
the hopes of improving their future chances in court. It therefore seems 
49
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plausible to suppose that the Athenian courts played a disciplinary role not 
by enforcing formal legal rules, but by enforcing extra-statutory norms. 
3.3. facilitating informal Sanctions
What was the relationship between the phenomenon of norm enforcement 
I am describing and the conventional mechanism of informal norm en-
forcement—social sanctions? Informal social sanctions naturally played an 
important role in enforcing extra-statutory norms in Athens (on gossip and 
the informal enforcement of social norms, see Hunter 1994, 96–119). The 
courts complemented, rather than supplanted, social sanctions. Athens was 
not a face-to-face society; the urban center was a bustling metropolis, and 
even members of the smallest rural demes would be forced to interact with 
men they didn’t know on frequent trips to the city (Osborne 1985b; Harris 
2002, 72–74; Ober 2008b, 74).
46 Information about norm violations would 
not always become known to potential business partners or the small group 
of neighbors and fellow demesmen who were in a position to enforce social 
sanctions. The courts may have assisted informal norm enforcement by im-
proving information flow (cf. Milgrom, North, & Weingast 1990, who ar-
gue that medieval institutions played a role in facilitating information flow 
about merchants’ trustworthiness). Court arguments based on violations 
of extra-statutory norms resulted not only in formal sanctions for norm 
violations through court verdicts. The courts gave litigants incentives to 
ferret out their opponents’ norm violations, and court speeches publicized 
these violations, making it more likely that other citizens in small village 
communities would impose informal social sanctions (Hunter 1994, 117). 
The importance of the recitation of an individual’s past norm violations 
in open court both as a mechanism to facilitate informal social sanctions 
and as a form of shame sanction in itself cannot be underestimated. Not 
only were hundreds of jurors present at every case, but court cases were a 
major form of public entertainment. Cases involving prominent citizens 
naturally drew the largest crowds (Aesch. 3.56; Plu. Dem. 5.1; Lanni 1997, 
184). But the courts were intermingled with market stalls in the agora, and 
we hear of casual spectators listening to ordinary cases as they went about 
their business in the agora (e.g., Eubulus fr. 74 K-A; Plu. Mor. 580d-f; Lanni 
46  Theophrastus’ agroikos (“country man”), for example, goes to the city to shop and get his 
hair cut. (Hansen 1999) also discusses evidence that Athenians regularly walked long dis-
tances from the countryside to attend assembly, choruses, festivals, etc.
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1997, 184). Litigants regularly assume that the community at large will be 
aware of court verdicts (Andoc. 1.105; Din. 1.22; Lys. 1.36). It seems likely 
that news of allegations made during a court case would find its way back to 
a litigant’s deme community, resulting in informal sanctions. In this respect, 
allegations of misconduct made in court could affect the reputation of the 
victorious litigant as well as his less fortunate opponent. Aeschines states, 
for example, that even if he wins his suit he will consider his life not worth 
living if anyone in the jury is convinced by his opponent’s extra-statutory 
accusation that he had committed hubris against a woman (Aesch. 2.5).
47 
And the experience of having one’s character publicly attacked or losing a 
vote of hundreds of one’s fellow citizens after personally presenting one’s 
case (and one’s character) must have been humbling.
There is no doubt that purely informal social sanctions, whether facili-
tated by court argument or not, could be significant. This was particular-
ly true in rural Attica, where citizens were dependent on neighbors and 
demesmen to help each other when drought, illness or other misfortune 
struck (Millett 1991). Nevertheless, formal sanctions meted out by the 
courts could be even more serious: the death penalty was available for a 
wide variety of infractions, for example, and other serious potential pun-
ishments included exile and loss of citizenship rights for oneself and one’s 
descendents. (MacDowell 1993: 254–58). 
Moreover, the possibility of finding oneself in serious legal trouble might 
provide incentives to avoid minor norm violations even though the poten-
tial social sanction was low. Athenians may have thought that it was worth 
a lot to be able to claim in court that they had an unblemished record.
48 
Litigants also may have feared the impression created by a slew of minor 
infractions, none of which individually was sufficient to incur serious so-
cial sanctions.
49 It is impossible to quantify what percentage of compliance 
47  The very fact of an accusation was thought to bring shame: Demosthenes alleges that his en-
emy Meidias convinced someone to bring charges against Demosthenes for military desertion 
even though he had no evidence and had no intention of proceeding to trial, because the 
notice of the charge in the agora would hurt Demosthenes’ reputation (Dem. 21.103). 
48  Litigants regularly make a point of noting that they have never wronged anyone or been pros-
ecuted (e.g. Lys. 5.3; 12.4; 16.10; 21.19; 24.24–6; Andoc. 1.147; Dem. 36.57; 37.56; 54.16). 
49  As several of the examples described in Part 2 demonstrate, litigants commonly list a long 
slew of norm violations committed by their opponent (e.g., Dem. 25.53–55; Aesch. 1.42). The 
impression these passages create is that the speaker hopes to paint a generally negative picture 
of his opponent with multiple charges. This strategy is consistent with Aristotle’s discussion in 
the Rhetoric (1.15) of the use of ethos in court speeches. 
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with extra-statutory norms can be traced to court practice. But the added 
incentives generated by court enforcement of norms taken together with 
litigants’ statements that they performed public service in order to improve 
their chances in court suggest that court enforcement of extra-statutory 
norms may well have had a significant impact on behavior. 
3.4. Norm enforcement, ancient and modern
Does anything akin to Athenian-style norm enforcement occur in mod-
ern courts? All but the most hard-line of legal formalists would admit that 
modern courts do at times enforce extra-statutory norms, in the sense that 
these norms play a role in the resolution of some cases, particularly cases 
heard by juries (e.g. Burns 1999, 20–30; Frug 1988).
50 But when modern 
courts enforce extra-statutory norms this process does not, for the most 
part, affect behavior in the same way that Athenian law seems to have done. 
Few modern individuals would alter their behavior toward their family for 
their entire adult lives in the hope that it would help them in any legal dis-
pute over an inheritance that might arise in the future. With the exception 
of some classes of repeat litigants or individuals who can anticipate or are 
in the midst of litigation,
51 the likelihood of being involved in litigation in 
the future is not high enough to justify changing behavior based on extra-
statutory norms that might or might not affect litigation. This is all the 
more true because, unlike in Athens, adherence to extra-statutory norms 
that are perceived to be completely unrelated to the dispute are less likely 
50  But for the most part in modern courts extra-statutory norms can only trump legal ones sur-
reptitiously while the Athenians openly recognized extra-statutory norms as legitimate factors 
in court verdicts (Burns 1999, 36). In a few limited cases, such as sentencing, and particularly 
capital sentencing, modern courts do explicitly permit consideration of a party’s adherence or 
non-adherence to a wide range of norms as part of the legal framework for deciding the case 
(see, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (A capital sentencing jury must be permit-
ted to consider as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendant’s character or record)).
51  For example, high profile, large corporations who routinely find themselves the subject of law-
suits might find it worthwhile to enhance the company’s public image for fear of bias in court 
(Haddad 2001 discusses Bill Gates’s offer of computers to poor schools in the face of antitrust 
action). Similarly, individuals under investigation for white-collar crimes might attempt to im-
prove their image in anticipation of criminal litigation and sentencing (Reeves 2006 describes 
Richard Scrushy’s increased religious activities when a fraud case was brought against him, and 
Eichenwald 1990 discusses Michael Milken’s charitable work in connection with sentencing on 
SEC-related criminal charges). In addition, individuals who are likely to be subject to a court’s 
power for a prolonged period of time, for example individuals in bankruptcy, those subject to 
a court-ordered shared custody arrangement, and those whose children have been removed 
from their homes by social services, have incentives to conform to extra-legal norms to win 
favor with the court. 
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to play a role. Being involved in a local charity, for example, might help in 
a criminal sentencing hearing (Eichenwald 1990) but would likely be much 
less helpful for a litigant in a family inheritance dispute.
If modern court decisions enforcing extra-statutory norms affect be-
havior prospectively, they do so primarily through the expressive func-
tion of law, a more indirect mechanism than the Athenian approach 
(Sunstein 1996). Modern courts rarely give individuals concrete incen-
tives to alter their behavior with regard to extra-statutory norms in di-
rect anticipation of litigation. Rather, when a modern court enforces 
extra-statutory norms in a high-profile case the decision communicates 
a message about community norms that may then filter down through 
the culture to affect behavior. For example, a highly-publicized unsuc-
cessful rape prosecution may communicate a message that the commu-
nity believes that provocatively-dressed women “deserve” to be raped, 
and this message may indirectly alter how women dress (Kennedy 1993, 
136–138, 162–175). 
Athenian courts also served an expressive function. Court speakers 
regularly discuss examples of what they consider to be proper and im-
proper behavior (Lape 2006). As has been pointed out, court speeches 
may have served an important role in creating, shaping, and disseminat-
ing community norms through persuasion (Lape 2006; Johnstone 1999, 
132). And the Athenian jury was permitted through its verdict to make a 
public statement about whether the litigants had abided by the commu-
nity’s values, regardless of the result suggested by a strict reading of the 
statute, will, or contract at issue. But because a jury’s verdict could turn 
on any of a number of specific legal or extra-statutory factors raised in 
the case, the jury’s ability to express a clear and precise moral statement 
was limited. The trial of Socrates is a good example. Although the jury’s 
overall condemnation of Socrates was well-known, his precise crime and 
exactly what the jury thought of him is unclear (and seems to have been 
unclear even at the time); the guilty verdict may have represented little 
more than a rejection of Socrates’ unorthodox manner of defending him-
self (Millett 2005). To be sure, Athenian court verdicts, and particularly 
court arguments, served an expressive function. But the primary means 
through which the Athenian courts enforced extra-statutory norms may 
have been by providing concrete incentives in anticipation of litigation, 
a more direct mechanism than the expressive approach familiar in mod-
ern courts. 
57
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4.   the aDvaNtaGeS of atheNiaN-StYle Norm 
eNforcemeNt 
The approach of enforcing extra-statutory norms through formal court 
processes was particularly well-suited to the Athenian context: that is, court 
enforcement of extra-statutory norms helped Athenian society function 
more smoothly, and more in keeping with Athenian values, than might have 
been the case if these norms had been reduced to statutes that were strictly 
enforced. This is not a normative argument. I make no claims with respect 
to whether the Athenian system helped to produce “efficient” norms. And, 
of course, from a modern perspective the conflict between the Athenian ap-
proach and contemporary rule-of-law values is hardly attractive. When I 
say that the Athenian approach was “effective,” I mean simply that it was 
likely to produce incentives for Athenians to comply with the norms that the 
Athenians sought to enforce. Many of these norms were not easily reducible 
to explicit statutes. The Athenian approach also compensated for problems 
in law enforcement stemming from a private prosecution system. A third 
advantage was that by permitting courts to enforce norms while appearing 
not to do so, the system bolstered the democratic ideal of a limited state.
It is also important to emphasize that by noting the advantages of the 
Athenian approach to norm enforcement I am not providing a functional-
ist analysis. That is, I am not arguing that the legal system developed as it 
did because it served these useful functions in the Athenian context. I have 
argued elsewhere that the Athenians’ loose approach to relevance and legal 
argument and the resulting ad hoc nature of popular court verdicts were 
based primarily in two ingrained cultural values: (1) a normative belief in 
contextualized and individualized justice and (2) a democratic commitment 
to wide jury discretion (Lanni 2006). The enforcement of extra-statutory 
norms through the courts was in my view the natural byproduct of a legal 
system that permitted and encouraged consideration of facts and argu-
ments unrelated to the specific requirements of the statute under which the 
suit was brought.
52 My argument here is that the Athenian mode of norm 
52  This is not to deny the possibility that the effectiveness of Athenian legal practices in maintaining 
order contributed to the persistence of Athenian legal institutions. But we have no direct evidence 
that this is the case, and process-oriented anthropological studies have demonstrated that societies 
can reach a successful equilibrium in the absence of social order (e.g. Roberts 1976; Comaroff and 
Roberts 1981; Bourdieu 1977; for an excellent discussion of trends in legal anthropology as they 
relate to classical Athens, see Cohen 1995, 1–24). 
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enforcement, though rooted in cultural values, had several advantageous 
effects. To borrow the terms used by Ian Morris (2002, 8) to distinguish 
between “humanistic” and “social scientific” approaches, this paper aims to 
help us “understand” Athenian legal culture rather than to “explain” it.
Given the Athenian context, enforcing extra-statutory norms through the 
courts was preferable to using formal rules to enforce these norms in court. 
The Athenian approach was preferable to a conventional rule-of-law approach 
because it promoted order and compliance with norms while preserving the 
Athenian attachment to discretionary and popular justice. In the context of a 
private prosecution system with sporadic enforcement, the Athenian approach 
may even have been more effective at fostering compliance with norms than if 
the Athenians had attempted to enforce these norms through formal rules. 
4.1. Difficulties in reducing Norms to rules 
One advantage of the Athenian approach was that many, though not all,
53 
of the extra-statutory norms could not be easily reduced to legal rules. 
Several of the norms the Athenians sought to enforce—treat your family 
well, be a good neighbor, exercise restraint in the face of conflict, conduct 
business honestly and fairly—were vague and context-specific. The average 
Athenian probably had a sense of what these norms entailed, but it would 
be difficult to capture the nuances of what the norm might require in a 
myriad of specific situations (Lanni 2006, 128–130). 
The Athenian courts’ approach of enforcing informal norms was par-
ticularly effective with respect to norms relating to public service. The com-
mitment to public service was a “never enough” norm. That is, the goal was 
to encourage as much giving and participation as possible. A formal rule 
prescribing the amount of service required would encourage Athenians to 
give only the minimum.
54 Because the norm was informal and open-ended, 
litigants could expect that any additional expenditures would translate into 
increased juror good will, and they therefore had incentives to give as much 
as possible. As we’ve seen, litigants often list their services in detail, empha-
sizing the total number of liturgies and the performance of particularly 
expensive services such as the triearchy on the theory that each outlay pro-
vided an incremental benefit in court.
53  As described above, some extra-statutory norms were also the subject of statutes.
54  The law did set a minimum requirement, but we have seen that going beyond the minimum 
could confer benefits in court proceedings.
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4.2. compensating for Sporadic legal enforcement
The second advantage of the Athenian approach arises from its peculiar 
quality that permitted a litigant to raise any norm violations his oppo-
nent had committed in the past against any person, however unrelated to 
the subject of the suit at hand. The Athenian approach compensated for 
difficulties of enforcement stemming from a private prosecution system 
by encouraging litigants to uncover and sanction their opponents’ past 
violations. 
The absence of public prosecutors
55 appears to have resulted in spotty 
enforcement. This was particularly true in the case of “victimless” offenses, 
such as draft-dodging, cowardice, tax and liturgy avoidance, and a number 
of other public laws. Social norms relating to sexual and other private con-
duct were also for the most part victimless, and would have suffered from 
similar enforcement difficulties if the Athenians had attempted to regulate 
these activities through formal legal rules. Victimless offenses were generally 
pursued through public suits (graphai) brought by volunteer prosecutors. 
In most public suits, the state rather than the prosecutor collected any fines 
from the defendant (MacDowell 1993, 257).
56 Moreover, if the prosecutor 
failed to win at least one-fifth of the votes at trial he was fined a substantial 
amount and barred from bringing public suits in the future (Harris 1999). 
Given the uncertainty of Athenian jury verdicts, this penalty must have served 
as a significant deterrent to prosecution. It seems that victimless crimes were 
prosecuted somewhat randomly, according to whether a personal enemy of 
the defendant or a man trying to make a public name for himself was willing 
to initiate a public suit despite the financial risks involved (on the motiva-
tions of public prosecutors, see Osborne 1985a; Christ 1998, 118–159). The 
Athenians were clearly worried about uneven enforcement of public laws 
and took steps to encourage prosecutions in certain types of case: for exam-
ple, the penalty for failing to win one-fifth of the votes was lifted for various 
public suits alleging misconduct by public officials (Christ 1998, 134–138), 
and successful prosecutors in suits recovering state property (apographe) or 
exposing individuals who were falsely representing themselves as citizens 
stood to collect a portion of the judgment (Christ 1998, 138). 
55  There were a few exceptions: a board of public advocates prosecuted officials at euthunai and 
“special prosecutors” were appointed in high salience political cases (Todd 1993, 92). 
56  In some special procedures, such as phasis and apographe, the prosecutor was entitled to a por-
tion of the fine collected (MacDowell 1993, 257). 
64
65724  ~  Lanni: Social Norms in the Courts of Ancient Athens
Prosecutions were likely sporadic even where there was a clear injured 
party with an incentive to sue to enforce the law. Where an individual vio-
lated a law ordinarily redressed by a public suit, for example hubris (roughly, 
“assault accompanied by insult”) or false arrest, the victim might be deterred 
from bringing suit because he, like any prosecutor in a public case, risked 
penalties and did not stand to gain financially from the verdict. In both pri-
vate and public cases, victims with considerably less money and social clout 
than their opponents were particularly likely to avoid litigation. A richer 
party had several advantages in court: he could afford a better speechwriter, 
would be likely to be a better public speaker by virtue of his education, and 
would have performed more public services (Christ 1998, 33). Moreover, 
even if a “little guy” prevailed in court, the absence of state mechanisms for 
enforcement of judgments (Todd 1993, 144–145) meant that a verdict might 
mean little if he didn’t have a group of friends to help him claim his due. 
Even a man as well-connected as Demosthenes could have trouble getting 
justice: he describes how he was unable to collect from Meidias even after he 
won both the original court case and an ejectment suit (Dem. 21.81).
For all these reasons, there appears to have been systematic under-enforcement  
of Athenian statutes through suits brought under those statutes.
57 And the pros-
ecutions that did occur may have been irregular and unpredictable, stemming 
from factors like political or personal rivalries that were not related to the se-
riousness or visibility of the infraction. The Athenian approach of enforcing 
extra-statutory norms in court helped compensate for the under-enforcement 
of the laws. A litigant could attack his opponent for any norm violation commit-
ted against anyone in the past, no matter how unrelated to the issue in dispute. 
This system gave litigants incentives to investigate their opponents and uncover 
any past violations of legal or extra-statutory norms.
58 For this reason, Athenians 
could not blithely commit victimless crimes or injure those who might be pow-
erless to sue them; these offenses could come back to haunt them if they ever 
found themselves in a court or other public hearing in the future. One litigant 
57  Of course, we have no idea what percentage of offenses were actually prosecuted. But the seri-
ous risks associated with bringing a public case as a volunteer prosecutor must have deterred 
some prosecutions of known offenders, particularly with respect to victimless crimes. And the 
fact that the Athenians took steps to encourage prosecutions in cases involving public cor-
ruption and failure to pay a state debt suggest that the Athenians thought under-enforcement 
was a real problem. Our surviving speeches also suggest that bribery of public officials was 
particularly problematic (Karayiannis and Hatzis 2008, 15).
58  Demosthenes tells us, for example, that in preparing for his prosecution of Meidias he collected 
examples of Meidias’ wrongful acts against others for use in his suit (Dem. 21.23). 
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states that his father is afraid to come into court to support him because the fa-
ther is afraid that if he does, someone will confront him with allegations of past 
wrongs he may have committed against them during his public life (Dem. 39.3). 
Demosthenes is quite explicit about how consideration of unrelated crimes can 
compensate for problems of under-enforcement in the Athenian system. He lists 
the many people Meidias has wronged in the past, noting that most of them did 
not bring suit because they lacked the money, or the speaking ability, or were 
intimidated by Meidias (Dem. 21.141). He then urges the jury to punish Meidias 
for these unprosecuted crimes: “for if a man is so powerful that he can commit 
acts of this sort and deprive each one of you of exacting justice from him, now 
that he is securely in our power, he should be punished in common by all of us as 
an enemy of the state” (Dem. 21.142). The speaker in Lysias 30 expresses a similar 
sentiment: “since [the defendant] has not paid the penalty for his crimes indi-
vidually, you must exact satisfaction now for all of them collectively” (Lys. 30.6, 
trans. Todd).
 It is of course true that the Athenian approach also decreased the incen-
tives to obey statutory law because even clear-cut violations of law might 
result in acquittals on extra-statutory grounds. It is impossible to quantify 
the gains and losses in compliance that would result from choosing either 
the Athenian or a rule-of-law system. But given the problems of under-
enforcement produced by the private prosecution system, particularly in 
the case of victimless offenses and offenses committed against victims who 
lacked the resources to sue, it seems likely that making any bad act fair 
game in any case would increase the chances of punishment (and thus the 
incentives to comply) more than a conventional rule-of-law approach. In 
any case, from the Athenian perspective their approach had the distinct ad-
vantage of fostering compliance while also promoting the Athenian com-
mitment to individualized and popular justice (Lanni 2006). 
So much for cases where the legal or extra-statutory norm violation had 
not been raised in a previous lawsuit. But the Athenian system also created 
redundancy in the system. In essence, litigants could be sanctioned again 
and again for the same legal or extra-statutory norm violation in every fu-
ture lawsuit. Did this approach lead to over-enforcement? Not necessar-
ily, because evidence of an individual norm violation did not mean that 
the litigant automatically lost his case. The jury considered the violation 
as part of a broader evaluation of the litigant’s conduct over his entire life; 
each past violation continued to be relevant to this exercise in every subse-
quent evaluation of the litigant’s character. For the same reason, with the 
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exception of particularly heinous crimes, the system did not undermine 
itself by creating a class of outlaws who had little incentive to comply once 
they had developed a reputation as a norm violator that might be used 
against them in court. Because any particular norm violation was just one 
factor among many considered by the jury, Athenians with prior records 
had incentives to rehabilitate themselves by demonstrating adherence to 
statutory and extra-statutory norms (e.g., Lys. 31.24). In this way, the en-
forcement of extra-statutory norms in Athenian courts was much more 
nuanced than those informal social sanctioning systems that rely on the 
relatively crude measure of temporary or permanent exclusion from the 
group for all violations.
59 
Perhaps most important, the Athenian approach did not set up a system 
whereby those with good character and public service had no incentives to 
obey the law. As I’ve described in detail elsewhere (Lanni 2006, 41–74), ju-
rors considered extra-statutory argumentation as part of their evaluation 
of what was a just and fair result, given the particular circumstances of the 
case and the character of the parties. In other words, the jury was not simply 
trying to determine and reward the litigant with the better character. Rather, 
jurors considered issues such as character and past acts as a way to help de-
termine what the litigants deserved in the context of the dispute before them 
(Lanni 2006, 59–64). The litigants’ character was extremely important, but 
having good character references would be unlikely to save a litigant from 
conviction in a dispute where he had clearly acted unfairly, and evidence of 
one piece of misconduct would be unlikely to doom the case of a litigant 
who was clearly in the right. We have several references to successful pros-
ecutions brought against prominent citizens who had performed public ser-
vices (e.g., Dem. 34.50, 59.72–86; Din. 1.13; 3.17). Given the stark economic 
differences between the liturgical class and the average juror, jurors were 
probably particularly sensitive to making sure that wealthy citizens could 
not place themselves above the law by virtue of their public services.
4.3. maintaining the fiction of a limited State
The Athenian approach to norm enforcement also promoted compliance 
with norms relating to private conduct and public service while maintaining 
59  For example, Bernstein 1996 and Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990 describe systems using 
the informal sanction of exclusion. But many informal systems do use a gradation of sanctions 
(Ellickson 1991, 213–219).
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the fiction of a limited state. By enforcing extra-statutory norms rather than 
formal rules relating to personal conduct and public service, the Athenians 
were able to maintain the fictions of an unregulated private sphere and of 
a city and military supported by patriotism and volunteerism rather than 
coercion. 
Athenian democratic ideology included the notion that the state did not 
interfere with private conduct that did not impinge on the state’s interests 
(Cohen 1991, 229 provides examples, including Dem. 22.51; Lys. 25.33; Ar. 
Pol. 1320a30). The locus classicus of this ideal is Thucydides’ account of 
Pericles’ funeral oration: 
There is no exclusiveness in our public life, and in our private business we 
are not suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbor if he does 
what he likes. We do not put on sour looks at him which, though harmless, 
are not pleasant. While we are thus unconstrained in our private business, 
a spirit of reverence pervades our public acts; we are prevented from doing 
wrong by respect for the authorities and for the laws (Thuc. 2.39). 
Scholars have interpreted such statements, along with Athenian legal prac-
tice, as evidence of a “private sphere” of conduct free from legal regulation 
(Cohen 1991; Wallace 1997). These scholars have pointed out that in Athens 
there was no morals legislation as such; legislation was limited to activity that 
harmed a specific victim or affected the state’s interest (Cohen 1991; Wallace 
1997). Thus there was no provision to prosecute an adulterer in the courts 
because Athenian law “did not aim at regulating adultery as a form of sexual 
misconduct” (Cohen 1991, 124). Rather, the law sought to regulate adultery 
“as a source of public violence and disorder” by addressing only a limited 
situation: what options were available to a man who caught an adulterer in 
the act (Cohen 1991, 124). Similarly, the law generally permitted homosexu-
ality and prostitution. In fact, prostitution was subject to state taxes and the 
state condoned the practice by treating contracts for sexual services just like 
any other enforceable contract (Aesch. 1.119, 160–161; Lys. 3.22–26; Aesch. 
1.160–161; Cohen 2000, 2007). But several laws protected young boys from 
homosexual advances by older men.
60 And a citizen who had been a prosti-
tute was not permitted to speak in the Assembly, apparently on the theory 
60  If a relative or guardian hired out a boy as a prostitute, both the relative/guardian and the 
customer could be prosecuted under a graphê (Aesch. 1.13–14). A separate law provided that 
acting as a pimp for a free boy was punishable by death (Aesch. 1.14). For a discussion of this 
topic, see Cohen 1991, 176.
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that such a man was morally unworthy of democratic leadership (Aesch. 
1.19–20, 28–32; Dover 1989, 19–31; MacDowell 2000; Cohen 1991, 175–86; 
Fisher 2001, 36–52). For the Athenians, limited state interference in private 
conduct was one of the primary characteristics of a democracy (Thuc. 2.39; 
Dem. 25.25. Ar. Pol. 1310a30; Pl. Rep. 557b, 560–1, 565b, Laws 700a; Cohen 
1991, 124). 
We have seen that the state, through the law courts, did play a role in 
enforcing norms relating to private conduct. The courts played a disci-
plinary role, providing incentives for Athenians to comply with sexual and 
other norms of private conduct. But the fact that these norms were not ex-
pressed in statutes and were not the formal basis for lawsuits permitted the 
Athenians to maintain the fiction, central to their democratic ideology, that 
they enjoyed freedom in their private lives. At the same time, the legal sys-
tem did in practice help to foster adherence to norms of private conduct by 
creating incentives to comply beyond those provided through traditional 
informal sanctioning mechanisms. 
Another central tenet of Athenian democratic ideology was that its citi-
zens served the state out of patriotism rather than coercion. The Athenian 
victory over the much more numerous Persians was often put down to the 
superiority of free men fighting for their homeland over a force made up, in 
Euripides’ words, of “all slaves but one” (Eur. Helen 276). The Athenians also 
compared their approach of exhorting citizens to virtue through education 
to that of the Spartans, who attempted to force its citizens to be brave and 
public-spirited through strict regulations, only to find them “running away 
from the law as boys from a father, because they have not been educated 
by persuasion but by force” (Pl. Rep. 548a-b, trans. Christ 2006; for discus-
sion see Christ 2006, 42–43). Christ has detailed the Athenian “preference 
for persuasion over compulsion” in promoting good citizenship (Christ 
2006, 42–43, 62–64). He notes that although legal procedures existed for 
prosecuting draft-dodging and avoidance of liturgies and taxes, such pros-
ecutions were relatively rare (Christ 2006, 40–45, 62–64). Athens did not 
actively try to encourage these prosecutions by, for example, providing for 
a state prosecutor
61 or relaxing the risks borne by volunteer prosecutors 
because “compulsion to serve the city was potentially in conflict with ideals 
of personal freedom . . . [;] Athenians were apparently uncomfortable with 
61  Appointed state prosecutors were used in high profile political cases and in euthunai (Todd 
1993, 92). 
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the rigid exercise of public authority against private individuals” (Christ 
2006, 62–63). 
Just as in the case of norms of private conduct, the courts did enforce 
norms relating to military and public service. But because these norms 
were extra-statutory and rarely served as the legal basis for lawsuits, the 
Athenians could tell themselves that discussion of these norms in court may 
have served to persuade and educate citizens, but did not constitute coer-
cion. The Athenian approach of enforcing extra-statutory norms through 
the courts created state sanctions for violations of public service norms, 
while at the same time permitting the Athenians to maintain the fiction 
that Athenians fought for and served the state out of patriotism. 
5. coNcluSioNS 
It is fashionable among historians and legal scholars to emphasize the limits 
of courts’ and laws’ ability to influence behavior. An Athenian court ap-
pears at first glance to have been an even weaker player in its milieu than its 
modern counterpart—highly unpredictable and prey to distracting stories 
about the litigants’ morality and “private” lives. But this system must have 
been capable of producing anxiety about the potential consequences of any 
violation of the community’s norms. This state of affairs is frightening to 
anyone brought up in a Western culture of individual rights and the rule-
of-law. But it must have been central to the operation of a society (and, for a 
time, an empire) that depended to a large degree on voluntary compliance 
with onerous norms of personal conduct—the norms of courage, sacri-
fice, public service, participation in self-governance, and obedience to law 
celebrated in Thucydides’ presentation of Pericles’ funeral oration (Thuc. 
2.37–40). That Pericles maintained that these qualities were “acquired by 
our style of living and not enforced by law” (Thuc. 2.39) suggests that the 
Athenian legal system may have been more effective than even most Athe-
nians realized. 
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